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Otherdeeds Part 1: Are They Securities?


2022 May 5 See all posts


Yuga Labs and Animoca released the most anticipated NFTs of 2022 (perhaps in history) on April 30, 2022. As they are not simply art and have substantial terms and conditions from two different companies attached to them, the NFTs pose significant questions about their legal status and the legal implications for consumers who purchased them. This two-part series will address:

  1. whether, based on current guidance from the SEC, the SEC is likely to consider Otherdeeds securities; and

  2. what litigation and enforceability issues may arise from the standard terms the minters agreed to, and secondary market buyers may be subject to.

Disclaimer before attempting to address those questions: I am a lawyer, but I am not your lawyer. This is my opinion based on my reading of the law and SEC guidance. The SEC and a court may disagree with me, in whole or in part. Do not make financial or legal decisions based on what you read here. Consult your own attorney or financial advisor. I have no affiliation with Animoca or Yuga, but I did try to participate in the public mint but failed – not enough ETH to pay the gas fees. Yuga refunded me 0.066239856ETH in gas for the failed transaction. As of writing, I still hold 614.87680809 $APE.

The short answer for Part 1: Unclear. The U.S. securities laws may not even apply to Otherdeeds. If they did, the SEC would probably argue Otherdeeds are securities. But there are significant issues the SEC would have to overcome in any enforcement action. Let's get into the details of why, but first, some basic background facts we can apply to the relevant legal framework.

The Mint and the Terms

The Mint

To mint an Otherdeed, an individual had to meet numerous requirements:

Assuming an individual met all these requirements, they would successfully mint either one or two Otherdeeds per KYC'd wallet they owned.

The terms of use on the Otherside.xyz site, the NFT purchase agreement, and the Otherdeed / Koda license agreement were not available until shortly before the mint began. These are multi-page documents with predictably dense legalese, buried at the bottom of the page in what looks like size negative 3 font:

When a user clicked the purchase an NFT button during the mint, they had to agree explicitly to the NFT Purchase Agreement. Prior to the mint, @OthersideMeta provided the following FAQs regarding the mint:

Given the constraints of the Ethereum blockchain's ability to process transactions, minting of the 55,000 Otherdeeds lasted roughly 2.5 hours. Some users requested to mint towards the beginning with high gas limits, some waited to see and then upped the gas offer later, others simply waited for gas prices to level out around 2ETH for the majority of the mint. (Over US$100M in gas alone was used during the mint. 🤯)

Finally, the 55,000 supply available for minting is not the total supply. It's only half. Yuga reserved 15,000 Otherdeeds to itself, Bored Ape Yacht Club and Mutant Ape Yacht Club owners are allowed to claim another 30,000 for free (plus gas), and Yuga will give another 10,000 Koda NFTs to lucky Otherdeed land owners. All told, the supply in this ecosystem is currently 110,000, including all Otherdeeds and Kodas.

The Agreements

Here are links to the relevant agreements:

Let's take a look at some of the key provisions in each one that could impact the question of whether these NFTs are an "investment contract."

The Terms & Conditions

The Terms & Conditions govern the use of the Otherside.xyz website. It is a pretty standard clickwrap agreement, but it doesn't really have any terms that are relevant for the securities analysis since it does not appear to govern anything directly to do with the Otherdeed or Koda NFTs.

NFT Purchase Agreement

This one is where the rubber hits the road. This agreement is only with Animoca (technically "Vantage Top Group Limited"), not Yuga, and of course is for the purchase of the Otherdeed itself.

In any event, during the minting process, purchasers had to affirmatively agree to this purchase agreement by checking a box and hitting accept. Secondary market purchases on OpenSea / LooksRare won't see this agreement unless they seek it out.

Here are the major terms relevant to the securities analysis:

And finally...

Otherdeed Terms / Koda License Agreement

This agreement is between Yuga and the owner/purchaser of a Koda. It's not clear yet how the Kodas that exist "on" some of the Otherdeeds are going to come into play. Per this agreement, Yuga is in charge of them, but no one minted a Koda, just the land through an agreement with Animoca, although Kodas do appear visually on the land. Here's an example:

Per the Koda License Agreement, there will be 10,000 Koda NFTs. Presumably these get distributed to the 10,000 Otherdeed owners that have the matching Koda. And once that happens, the Kodas themselves will have an owner, or a secondary market purchaser. At that point, these terms kick in. And here are the key provisions:

Now that the stage is set, let's take a look at whether these agreements collectively constitute an "investment contract."

Are Otherdeeds Securities?

My assumption going into this was that it would be a straightforward application of U.S. securities laws to the facts. I was wrong.

U.S. Securities Laws May Not Even Apply

There is a threshold issue to address first: do U.S. securities laws even apply to the sale of Otherdeeds? Otherdeeds were only sold by Animoca, not Yuga. Animoca appears to be a Hong Kong entity with its office located, per its website, at Unit 417-421, Cyberport 1, 100 Cyberport Road, Pokfulam, Hong Kong. The NFT Purchase Agreement also states the agreement is governed by Hong Kong law and any disputes must be resolved in Hong Kong. Yuga, for its part, appears to be "gifting" 10,000 Kodas to lucky Otherdeeds purchasers / claimers. Thus Yuga, a U.S. company, isn't selling anything.

This is really quite clever legal structuring. That is especially true because it comes literally one month after a U.S. District Court in the Southern District of New York, the most likely venue for any enforcement action, ruled that the Securities Act has territorial limits that prevented a consumer class action against the crypto exchange Binance. See JD Anderson v. Binance, No. 1:20-cv-2803, at *6–7 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. 2022.03.31).

As the court there explained, U.S. “securities laws apply to those 'transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.'" Id. (quoting Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 267 (2010)). Moreover, just buying a security (assuming it is a security) in the U.S. through the internet is not sufficient to make it a "domestic transaction" that would trigger the U.S. securities laws. Id. at 7 ("trade not considered domestic on the basis that the purchaser 'places a buy order in the United States for the purchase of foreign securities on a foreign exchange'" (quoting City of Pontiac Policemen's & Firemen's Ret. Sys. v. UBS AG, 752 F.3d 173, 187 (2d Cir. 2014))).

If that analysis holds up, Otherdeeds are not subject to U.S. securities laws regardless of whether they might fit the definition of a security pursuant to those laws. Full stop.

But the minting process actually occurred on Otherside.xyz, which is Yuga's website. So even though the NFT Purchase Agreement is between what are likely many U.S. purchasers and Animoca, the SEC might have a pretty good argument the transaction itself was actually domestic — if it could prove Otherside.xyz is a U.S. website. But that's not a slam dunk, because apparently it was registered in Canada back in March 2020:

Moreover, the Binance court also said, helpfully for Animoca, that "third-party servers and third parties' choices of location are insufficient to deem Binance a national securities exchange." JD Anderson v. Binance, No. 1:20-cv-2803, at *7 (ALC) (S.D.N.Y. 2022.03.31). This is not what you call an open and shut enforcement case.

But let's assume for a moment the SEC comes up with a clever argument to get around the extraterritoriality defense — something along the lines of Yuga and Animoca are essentially a joint venture for this project, so Yuga's U.S. contacts should be counted against Animoca. Are these NFTs securities if U.S. law applies to them?

To do this analysis, we have to apply two tests. First the Howey test from the U.S. Supreme Court. Second, the SEC's limited guidance in the form of its FinHub department's Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets (2019.04.03) (the "framework").

The Howey Test

Established by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Howey test requires an analysis of four key parts of any arrangement to determine whether it is an "investment contract" (a term used by the Securities Act of 1933) and thus a security. A court will ask if the arrangement involves:

  1. an investment of money

  2. in a common enterprise

  3. with an expectation of profits

  4. from the efforts of others.

SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). (Coincidentally, this case involved the sale of citrus grove land in Florida.)

The first prong is easily met, at least for the minters who agreed to pay 305 – 610 $APE for their Otherdeeds. But that only accounts for 50% of the existing supply of NFTs in this ecosystem. Of the existing 100,000 Otherdeeds, 55,000 were purchased during the mint; the other 45,000 were reserved for Yuga (15,000) or Bored Ape / Mutant Ape holders (30,000). And then there are another 10,000 Koda NFTs that are apparently tied to 10% of the Otherdeeds.

For the Bored Ape / Mutant Apes who simply had to claim their Otherdeeds, they couldn't get them without purchasing their ape and paying gas fees to make the claim, but arguably they essentially got them for free and thus there was no "investment of money," just the fee you would have to pay to make any transaction on the Ethereum blockchain happen, which neither Yuga nor Animoca receive. There's a similar issue with the Kodas which are going to be distributed by Yuga, a separate company, apparently for free based on who owns the Otherdeeds. And, perhaps not accidentally, with the addition of 10,000 "free" Kodas to the Otherside ecosystem, there is a 50/50 split between NFTs that were paid for and those that were "free."

55,000 people clearly made the investment of money required to meet this prong of the test. But Yuga/Animoca can argue the fact that a full 50% of the available supply involved no investment of money, and that supply is also owned by a broad swath of consumers, changes the calculus because it would require saying the NFTs are a security only half the time. This is another clever move to make an enforcement action harder.

The common enterprise prong is easily met. Yuga and Animoca are working with a growing pool of employees to create this project, the art, the NFTs, and the forthcoming utility in a MMO MetaRPG game. This is very clearly a "common enterprise." Almost no one who is buying these NFTs has the skillset to try to create what Yuga and Animoca are attempting, nor do they want to. The whole point is the buyer does next to nothing while Yuga and Animoca build the project and create value.

The third prong, expectation of profits, starts to get more challenging. Animoca, in the Otherdeed NFT Purchase Agreement, made minters agree they are

not purchasing any Otherdeed with the with the intent or expectation of profits from any appreciation in value or otherwise from the Otherdeed or any Access Rights that may from time to time be granted by Animoca or third parties.

The thing is, the Supreme Court in Howey itself said it doesn't matter what you say it matters what you do, and just agreeing you have no expectation of profits is wholly unlikely to move the needle for a court evaluating whether the reality of the arrangement involves an expectation of profits. See S.E.C. v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 300 (1946) (legal test looks to how the economic reality of how the arrangement functions “regardless of the legal terminology in which such contracts are clothed.”).

Thus a court is more likely to look at what's happening on the ground. Lots of people paid many thousands of dollars for a jpeg of some land, with the promise that it will be useful in a game to be released at some unknown time in the future. There is an active marketplace for those jpegs that is ~2X the price to mint as of writing, and in most cases many multiples more. "The art is amazing" is not a rational justification for why people are spending these sums of money on art before they could even see it, much less use it for gaming.

The more plausible explanation is that most people minted Otherdeeds precisely because they hoped to profit from the purchase. Indeed, that seems the only rational explanation for the crushing demand to participate in the mint itself. That explanation will be bolstered by a lengthy digital record from 20,000+ purchasers talking about making an investment, the price mooning, the gas fees being worth the flip, and so on.

Okay, but people can be idiots. They do crazy things that make no rational sense, and spend thousands of dollars on rare shoes. Shoes are not securities. And the Otherdeeds contract makes totally clear you basically can't do anything with it other than print it out or set it as your profile picture on social media, or "display" it in a non-commercial use. It's hard to see how anyone could expect to profit from that arrangement. This prong is debatable.

Last prong — solely from the efforts of others. It appears Otherdeeds are meant to involve the direct, personal involvement of the owners in the game Yuga / Animoca are creating. According to Otherside's website, "[r]ather than a static representation of a piece of land, your Otherdeed is designed to evolve along with what you choose to do in the game." Yuga has also given Koda owners a full commercial license, suggesting that it's up to them to realize a profit from the Koda, or not, based on their own efforts.

Those facts might weigh against finding Otherdeeds/Kodas are securities, but there's a problem — none of that is possible now, so there is literally no way any purchaser can participate in anything other than buying the Otherdeed NFT. No one can harvest resources on the land, use the Koda associated with it, or anything else that's part of the Otherside roadmap. The Koda NFTs do not appear to exist yet. The only thing a purchaser can do with an Otherdeed is sell it to someone else who wants to buy it. (Remember, no commercial use for Otherdeeds.) So, by default, everything is based on the efforts of Yuga and Animoca, not the owner of the Otherdeed / Koda. In their current form, the fourth and final prong is likely met under the Howey test.

All told, there are tough questions on the first and third prongs of the Howey test, and it's not clear to me how a court would interpret these nuances in this context. Result: unclear.

FinHub's Test

That's not the end of the story, though. FinHub issued its guidance on digital assets that has a whole host of factors to consider in this space. In typical fashion, the SEC disclaims this guidance applies outside of FinHub, so it's not clear if or how the Enforcement Division will apply them, but it's a worthwhile starting point.

The factors are a lengthy list, so rather than repeat it we'll walk through each factor simultaneously with the analysis. FinHub's guidance pretty much assumes the first two factors of Howey (investment of money in a common enterprise) will always be met and so focuses on what would trigger a conclusion that the investment had an expectation of profits based on the efforts of others, so this won't help us answer the problems identified above with the "investment of money" issue.

Important for this analysis is FinHub's definition of an "Active Participant" or "AP," which it defines as a "promoter, sponsor, or other third party (or affiliated group of third parties)" who "provides essential managerial efforts that affect the success of the enterprise."

Let's run through each of the factors FinHub says you should consider.

Based on the Efforts of Others

Where the network or the digital asset is still in development and the network or digital asset is not fully functional at the time of the offer or sale, purchasers would reasonably expect an AP to further develop the functionality of the network or digital asset (directly or indirectly). This particularly would be the case where an AP promises further developmental efforts in order for the digital asset to attain or grow in value.

Reasonable Expectation of Profits

See you on the Otherside in t-minus 4 hours đź‘€ Bring your $APE or ETH @OthersideMeta pic.twitter.com/8fz54WVw5k

— OpenSea (@opensea) April 30, 2022

Factors Weighing Against Being a Security

FinHub next offers a series of factors that would indicate a digital asset is not a security. Let's walk through those as well.

What does it mean?

To recap:

If the SEC can resolve the territorial/jurisdictional issues in its favor, it seems extremely likely that the SEC would conclude Otherdeeds are securities applying its current FinHub framework, although it's not clear — at all — a court would agree with that interpretation or weight the factors in the SEC's favor given the paucity of case law in this area. And the one clearly applicable case favors Animoca, not the SEC, on the threshold issue of whether U.S. securities laws even apply.

If I were the SEC, this is not the test case I would want to bring to start building a helpful body of case law on the NFTs-are-securities theory. Too many issues, too much sophistication and money in the defense, too long to a result.

Originally published May 5, 2022.